Would Indonesia’s data-centre operators pay a contractor to promise a grid connection date?

At an energy forum in Jakarta in September, the chairman of Indonesia’s data-centre association made an unusual offer. His members, Hendra Suryakusuma said, were willing to pay for substations themselves, and “potentially” the tax on the grant as well [1]. A month earlier he had explained what they were after: their supply contracts with PLN, the state electricity company, carry no binding date for switching on the power, and to investors that date matters more than a cheaper tariff [2].

The arithmetic behind the offer is striking. A data-centre campus costs at least Rp18 trillion per 100 megawatts [1]. On the few prices we could find, the grid connection costs perhaps 1–2% of that [9][12], yet it decides when the rest starts to earn. That invites an obvious business: sell operators the date. The catch is that much of the date may be out of any contractor’s hands. What is left to sell is narrower, and whether it is worth buying turns on one question nobody has answered in public.

Why a campus worth trillions waits on a substation

A data centre is a building that houses other companies’ computers. Its owner sells them space, cooling and, above all, dependable electricity, commonly priced by the kilowatt per month; one broker’s model for Jakarta uses US$200 [6]. Until the grid reaches the building, there is nothing to rent out.

Electricity itself is not what is short. The Java-Madura-Bali grid has about 49 gigawatts of generating capacity and a reserve of around a third [5]. “The issue isn’t generation, it’s transmission,” Hendra has said [7]. The lines and substations that carry power to a site are what lag. PLN served 159 data-centre customers with 1.99 gigawatts in July, and about 7.4 gigawatts of planned demand had reached the supply-contract stage by September [1]. The Java-Bali grid is projected to absorb only 3,207 megawatts of the more than 12,000 megawatts of high-voltage data-centre demand expected between 2026 and 2030 [5].

Getting a campus switched on means passing through a chain of steps, and different people control each one.

From signed contract to rent: who controls each step

  1. 1. Supply contract
    Operator and PLN sign. On the association’s account, it carries no binding switch-on date.
  2. 2. Permits
    Six to nine months across several ministries, the association says. Mostly the government’s pace.
  3. 3. Capacity upstream
    PLN’s lines and substations must be able to carry the load, and land along new lines must be settled. Outside a contractor’s control.
  4. 4. Works at the site
    The site’s substation, the switching bays that join it to PLN’s line, and dedicated cable. The stretch a contractor controls.
  5. 5. Testing and certificate
    The installation passes technical checks and needs an operating certificate before PLN connects it.
  6. 6. Power and rent
    The campus is switched on and tenants can start paying by the kilowatt.
Assembled by us from reporting and regulation. The division of control is our inference; only the fourth step is work a hired contractor can fully drive. Combines sourced figures and stated assumptions. Sources: [2] [5] [6] [11] [12] [13] [14]

How long the chain takes depends on whom you ask. Developers want to be connected in about 18 months, while PLN’s permanent substations generally take up to 24 [5]. Katadata reported that some association members have waited two to three years for a substation [7], and one broker estimates 36 months to connect 100 megawatts, against 12 in Malaysia [6].

Why operators put up with it

The arrangement has its logic. A PLN-built connection carries a regulated fee, with the cost of any dedicated network added to the customer’s bill [14], though we could not find what data-centre customers actually pay. PLN can also move quickly for customers at the front of its programme. In February it finished a 150-kilovolt substation for Microsoft at the Deltamas industrial estate in Cikarang, ahead of target [4]. It has committed 1.45 gigawatts to Digital Edge’s campus and 1.2 gigawatts to BDx, including a new substation for the latter [1].

Operators outside that front group have other options, each with a limit:

Alternative What the operator gets What it costs What it leaves open
PLN builds the connection A connection, sometimes quickly [4] The regulated fee plus dedicated network costs [14] No binding date [2]
Hire a contractor directly, such as Elsewedy Electric Indonesia Transformers, civil works and installation [12] Rp188.5 billion for one 150-kilovolt data-centre job, under a PLN contract [12] The operator still manages the contractor and PLN; we found no date promise to a private operator
Buy a plot in an estate such as Deltamas Land with assured power, reported at 993 megavolt-amperes [6] Land reportedly up from Rp4.2 million to Rp8.5 million per square metre in about a year [3] Works only on the estate’s plots
Wait for PLN’s next substations About 2 gigawatts at Karawang, Purwakarta and Subang [3] The cost of idle capital Nothing before the targeted fiscal years 2028–29

For an operator building one or two campuses, learning to run high-voltage construction alongside PLN is, we infer, a poor use of its own staff. What has changed is that PLN now invites them to build. “We compensate the construction cost, we give incentives, and this is already running,” a PLN account manager told the same forum [1]. We could not find the terms.

In Malaysia, a specialist contracting trade has already grown around this work. In August, CBH Engineering began an RM88.05 million contract (about Rp380 billion, at an assumed Rp4,300 per ringgit) to design and build a 275-kilovolt station connecting a private company’s data centre, due to finish nine months later [9]. Jati Tinggi won a similar RM86 million job [11] and reports an order book of RM1.4 billion across all its work [10]. In Indonesia, the contractor jobs we found were PLN’s own substations [12][13]. That is what our searches turned up, not proof that private jobs do not exist.

A date no contractor can fully promise

So why not sell operators a guaranteed date for the whole connection? Because the contractor would be promising other people’s work. Substations at strategic data-centre locations such as Deltamas, Cibatu and Cirata are projected to run above 90% of their load in 2026 and 2027 if a component fails [5]. Permits take six to nine months across several ministries, and “sometimes we obtain the permit to build, but the transmission never gets finished,” Hendra said [2]. A practitioners’ paper from Banten shows how that looks: Siemens Energy installed a 150-kilovolt substation at a factory site, and it sat unused while its feeding line waited, with the authors pointing to unsettled compensation for land and buildings along the route [13]. Speed on site would not have helped.

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A promise covering those steps would either ruin the contractor or be hedged until it meant nothing. What can honestly be sold is a date on the part a contractor controls, starting only once PLN has confirmed in writing that capacity exists upstream. And before that, an answer to the question operators most need settled: which step is really setting my date?

What the company would sell

Call it a Dated Connection Contractor. Its customer is a foreign or mid-size operator in West Java with a signed supply contract and no place at the front of PLN’s programme. The sequence below is our proposal; we found no published Indonesian operator-funded project described in enough detail to confirm it.

The first sale is a readiness study, for perhaps Rp1–3 billion (our assumption). The company traces upstream capacity, cable route, permits, design and equipment for one site, then tells the operator what is holding its date. The operator learns something useful even when the answer is “wait for PLN”. The contractor gains a relationship and a growing record of what actually delays projects.

If PLN confirms upstream capacity, the operator can sign a single design-and-build contract for the site’s substation, the switching bays that join it to PLN’s line, and the dedicated cable. Day to day, the company books production slots with transformer and switchgear makers against deposits, which matters because industry players report bottlenecks in equipment imports [15]. It reuses designs PLN has already reviewed, runs civil, cable and bay work side by side, and carries the submissions and testing through to the operating certificate required before connection [14]. Its own money is at risk through delay damages on those steps. The clock stops for PLN’s upstream work, land and approvals.

Why would an operator buy this rather than hire Elsewedy directly, presumably at about the same price? Not to save money. It would pay to have one party carry the dates and the dealings with PLN, and to get power sooner where that party’s work is what stands in the way. That the specialist would actually finish sooner is unproven: Malaysia’s nine-month contract shows such a schedule has been agreed there, at a higher voltage, with an equipment scope we do not know.

The buyers are few and easy to identify, and could be reached through the association, project advisers, estate managers and PLN’s account teams. Sales would be slow and references would count for a great deal. The most plausible founders are former PLN project engineers with a regional specialist as shareholder or technical partner. Performance bonds, assumed at 5–10% of each job, and equipment deposits make it unlikely that a small startup could do this alone. We know of no such team or partnership today.

What a day of delay is worth

Start with the operator. Take one broker’s estimated cash return of 10–11% a year on what a data centre costs to build [6]. At 10%, Rp18 trillion of finished campus sitting idle gives up about Rp150 billion a month, or Rp5 billion a day. This is our illustration, not a reported loss. Now suppose a connection job costs Rp200 billion and the company charges an extra Rp10 billion, an assumed 5%, for carrying the date. That premium equals two days of delay on a fully built campus. Few operators build everything at once, and money not yet spent is not idle; on an illustrative 20-megawatt first phase the same premium equals about ten days.

Time is worth far more than the premium, then, but only when the contractor’s step is the one holding things up. If PLN’s line is late, an early substation saves nothing. The business also leaves the biggest cost in this story, upstream delay, untouched, and it keeps little of the time it does save: it earns a contract margin and a small premium, and the rest stays with the operator.

The operator also has to be in a hurry, and the evidence conflicts. A broker reports 20.4% of Jakarta’s rentable capacity standing vacant [6]. The chief technology officer of Danantara, the state asset fund, says new capacity “will be fully taken up immediately” and customers wait six months to a year [15]. An operator with empty halls will not pay for days.

Now the company. Malaysia’s listed specialists show what the trade can earn: net profit of about 5% of revenue at Jati Tinggi in its latest quarter and about 20% at CBH in its second quarter, on our calculation from whole-company results [9][10]. On a Rp200 billion job that is Rp10–40 billion. Against an assumed Rp15–25 billion a year of overhead, the company needs about one job a year to stand still. Because a connection is a one-off purchase, there is no rent-or-own sum to win: the buyer can always hire the same work at about the same price, and an in-house team probably pays back only after three or four connections (our assumption).

One job a year

How many jobs are there? Begin with the 7.4 gigawatts at contract stage [1]. Remove the three giant commitments, keep West Java’s share, keep only what the grid can absorb and what operators would contract themselves, and spread it over five years. That leaves about 76–280 megawatts a year, or Rp95–700 billion of work. Most of those narrowing steps are assumptions, set out in the notes. A new company winning a quarter to half of that would take Rp24–350 billion a year.

That range means one job or none in many years. The middle could support a small, focused contractor; the low end could not, without other high-voltage work. Growth could come from later phases of the same campuses, other heavy industrial customers, and estates in Batam and Central Java, where PLN is steering projects [1]. Expanding from West Java to those estates, we estimate revenue of perhaps Rp40–360 billion by year five, a figure that rests heavily on assumed shares. Later still, PLN says it is open to working with data-centre investors who can build the far larger 500-kilovolt lines faster than it can [8].

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A steadier buyer may exist. Estates already sell land with power attached. A brokerage note reports that Deltamas land rose from Rp4.2 million to Rp8.5 million per square metre within about a year, underpinned by investment in switchgear and substations [3]. Illustratively, that rise on ten hectares comes to Rp430 billion, more than either job price above. An estate owner that paid for a shared substation, which we call an Estate Shared Substation, might recover the cost in land prices and buy again as plots fill. This has the largest potential of the routes we reviewed and the thinner evidence: PLN built Microsoft’s substation at Deltamas itself [4] and appointed Elsewedy for a data-centre substation there [12]. If estates get substations without paying, they will not pay.

What stops it

The opening may close on its own. PLN plans about 2 gigawatts of new substations by fiscal 2028–29 [3] and is considering mobile substations as a stopgap, which one of its vice presidents calls very effective at closing the gap [5]. Each shrinks the waiting list a contractor would sell against.

Rivals can copy it. Elsewedy makes transformers of up to 500 kilovolts and describes itself as Indonesia’s only maker of mobile substations [12], so it could add a date promise using its own equipment. Malaysian specialists have the references a newcomer lacks. By then the new company would hold only references, repeat designs and knowledge of PLN’s process. That advantage can be repeated from job to job, but it is not one others cannot acquire.

PLN may also simply not cooperate. It controls upstream capacity and, as far as we can tell, whether a finished connection is accepted, and it could decline to take a new contractor’s work on terms an operator can price. And a single missed date, with damages attached, could sink a company living on one job a year.

The check that comes before any company

None of this needs a company to test. Reconstruct five to eight recent West Java projects outside PLN’s largest customers, with operators, contractors and former PLN staff, and identify which step last set each switch-on date. Ask PLN in writing for its terms for customer-built works. If upstream capacity, land or approvals set the date on more than half of them, or PLN will not state terms, the idea is weak. If it survives, put a priced readiness study in front of those operators. If none will pay a few billion rupiah to learn what is holding its date, there is no business.

What is documented: operators say they want dates more than tariffs and will fund works, PLN says it compensates builders, and a specialist contracting trade operates in Malaysia. What we infer: that foreign and mid-size operators would rather hand this work to one accountable party. What remains unknown, and decides it: how often the contractor’s part is the part that sets the date, and whether PLN’s terms leave room for a newcomer.

We would like to hear from operators’ project heads, former PLN engineers, contractors who have built operator-funded connections, and estate managers who know who paid for their last substation.

Research Notes

The sources, calculations and evidence records behind this investigation. Numbered citations in the article link here; ↩ returns to the text.

Translations from Indonesian are ours. The plain-language descriptions of data centres and of the connection chain are our own general explanation, assembled from the cited sources; the division of control across the chain is our inference, and the operating sequence for operator-funded builds is hypothetical.

Sources and access

1. Gerak Gesit PLN Menjaga Momentum Data Center ↩

Katadata, 6 November 2026; full text read. PLN and IDPRO remarks made in early September 2026; capacity, investment and compensation claims. Compensation terms are not given.

2. Data center industry seeks firm power connection timelines over lower tariffs ↩

Petromindo, 5 August 2026; full text read. The association’s account of the contracts, permits and Malaysia’s benchmark; contracts themselves unseen.

3. Data Center: KTAs from Meeting with JLL ↩

BRI Danareksa Sekuritas, 11 September 2026; web summary read. Substation plan, land prices, tariff. A broker’s account of a meeting; land price is “reportedly”.

4. PLN completes substation for Microsoft data center ↩

Petromindo, 14 February 2026; full text read. PLN’s own account of finishing ahead of target.

5. Permintaan Data Center di Indonesia Tinggi, Pasokan Listrik Tidak Mendukung ↩

Youngster.id, 2 November 2026, citing The Asian Business Review; full text read. Absorption, build times, loading, mobile substations, allocations. A secondary report.

6. Mirae Asset Bets on Infrastructure Suppliers Over Operators ↩

Investortrust, 18 September 2026; full text read. Broker’s estimates of vacancy, yields, rent and 36-month connection time; estate power. Estimates from a securities firm, reported by a third party.

7. Data Center RI Butuh Tambahan Listrik 2.000 MW ↩

Katadata, 28 August 2026; full text read. Transmission remark and the two-to-three-year wait.

8. PLN Records Potential 13 GW Data Center Power Demand ↩

Ecobiz Asia, 4 September 2026; full text read. Priority classes and PLN’s invitation on 500 kV.

9. CBH Engineering lands RM88m Selangor job ↩

The Edge Malaysia, September 2026; full text read. Contract dates, client type and quarterly results. Capacity and equipment scope not stated.

10. Jati Tinggi 3Q net profit more than doubles ↩

The Edge Malaysia, 28 October 2026; full text read. Results and order book, company-wide.

11. Jati Tinggi wins RM86mil data centre contract ↩

The Star, 30 June 2026; full text read. Scope includes testing and handover for commercial operation.

12. Kolaborasi PLN-Elsewedy, Wujud Nyata Elektrifikasi RI ↩

Listrik Indonesia, 29 January 2024; full text read. Client is PLN; capacity unstated; capabilities are the company’s own description.

13. Pembangunan Gardu Induk 150 kV Lautan Baja Indonesia ↩

Jurnal Praktik Keinsinyuran, Atma Jaya, 2025; abstract only. One site.

14. Permen ESDM 27/2017, Articles 9, 10 and 18 ↩

Original regulation text read; later amendments are not consolidated, so current wording should be checked.

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15. Indonesia’s data center push gains ground, but faces execution test ↩

The Jakarta Post, 3 September 2026; visible portion only, paywalled. Equipment imports and Danantara’s remarks.

Competitors and substitutes

Name Offering Pricing Customers and channel Performance on the date Source
PLN project units Builds substations and connections Connection fee plus dedicated network cost; data-centre amounts not found All high-voltage customers; priority account teams and supply contracts Microsoft substation ahead of target; others report two to three years; no binding date [1][2][4][7][14]
PT Elsewedy Electric Indonesia Transformers up to 400 MVA and 500 kV; substation works; self-described sole local mobile-substation maker US$12.6 million (about Rp188.5 billion) for one data-centre scope; capacity unstated PLN and regional buyers; direct appointment Scheduled for 2024; actual result not found [12]
PT Siemens Energy Indonesia 150 kV substation installation Unknown PLN substation at an industrial site; direct contract Built, then idle awaiting its line [13] (abstract only)
Operator-managed procurement The operator’s team hires designers and contractors Project cost; Malaysian analogue RM88.05 million Operators with engineering teams; direct tender Association members say they are willing; results not reported [1][9]
Estates such as Kota Deltamas (Puradelta Lestari) Land with assured power, reported at 993 MVA Land reportedly Rp4.2 million to Rp8.5 million per sqm Plot buyers; direct land sales Described as preferred for plug-and-play power [3][6]
PT Cikarang Listrindo Private power supply in its area Unknown Industrial customers; a broker’s data-centre beneficiary Current data-centre load not found; coverage from search results only [6]
CBH Engineering; Jati Tinggi (Malaysia) Design-build of data-centre connections; not shown in Indonesia RM86–88 million per job Data-centre clients in Malaysia (CBH’s named as a private company); direct contracts One nine-month contract; RM1.4 billion order book across Jati Tinggi’s work [9][10][11]
Waiting for PLN’s planned substations Karawang, Purwakarta, Subang, about 2 GW Carrying cost of idle capital Operators without urgency Targeted ready FY28–29 [3]

Evidence ledger

  • Observed: supply contracts lack binding dates, on the association’s account; we have not seen the contracts [2]. Projected loading above 90% at three West Java substations [5]. A finished substation idle over its line [13].
  • Inferred: the demand a date-carrying contractor would capture. The opening is a hypothesis; we have no evidence that directly hired contractors decline to offer such terms. The reason it persists (a new operator-paid route, contractor work reported for PLN, little reason for an operator to build this know-how) is also inferred.
  • Not established: the 18-against-24-month gap [5] concerns PLN’s permanent substations, so it does not show a specialist could beat a directly hired contractor on the same scope. “Up to 36 months” is a broker’s estimate [6]; the two-to-three-year wait is Katadata’s narration of Hendra’s remarks, not a direct quotation [7]. The Hendra quotation on the grant tax does not say who receives the grant; we read it as handing the asset to PLN [1].
  • Conflicting: 20.4% Jakarta vacancy from a broker [6] against Danantara’s account of immediate take-up [15].
  • Dropped: transformer lead times, found only in search summaries of material outside Southeast Asia; an S&P Global article that could not be read.

Economics workings

  • Connection share of campus cost (estimate): Rp188.5–380 billion [9][12] against Rp18 trillion per 100 MW [1] is 1.0–2.1%, assuming a job serves about 100 MW. At 150 MW, as the sizing below assumes, it is 0.7–1.4%. No source states the capacity of either job, and this is the weakest input.
  • Carrying cost (illustration): Rp18 trillion × 10% ÷ 12 = Rp150 billion a month, Rp5 billion a day. A 20 MW first phase is Rp3.6 trillion, Rp30 billion a month, Rp1 billion a day. Modelled rent at US$200 per kW and Rp18,074 per dollar would give up to about Rp361 billion a month per 100 MW before vacancy [1][6].
  • Price (evidence plus analogue): Rp188.5 billion [12]; RM88.05 million × assumed Rp4,300 = about Rp380 billion [9]; RM86 million is about Rp370 billion [11]. The Rp200 billion job is an illustration.
  • Delivery cost (assumption): 75–90% of price, Rp150–180 billion on Rp200 billion, for a contribution of Rp20–50 billion. No Indonesian cost split was found.
  • Acquisition (assumption): Rp1–3 billion per won job, partly offset by study fees.
  • Net margin (evidence, company-level, our calculation): Jati Tinggi RM8.01 million on RM156.05 million is 5.1%; the prior quarter, RM9.85 million on RM87.8 million, is 11.2% and included a RM2.31 million gain [10]. CBH RM24.53 million on RM120.93 million is 20.3% [9]. None is a contract margin or Indonesian.
  • Premium and bonds (assumptions): a schedule element of 3–5% (Rp6–19 billion on the job range); bonding at 5–10% (Rp10–38 billion). No paid premium has been observed.
  • Overhead (assumption): Rp15–25 billion a year.
  • First market: 7.4 GW [1], less Digital Edge 1.45 GW and BDx 1.2 GW [1] and DayOne 450 MW [5], is about 4.3 GW, assuming these sit inside the 7.4 GW. West Java at 65%, from 1.3 of 1.99 GW connected [1] as a proxy, is 2.8 GW. Upstream-ready share 27–50%: the low end is the reported 3,207 of 12,000 MW [5], close to the 3,534.8 MW of about 13 GW PLN classes as Priority 1 [8]; the high end is assumed. Operator-contracted share 50–100% (assumption). Result 0.38–1.4 GW; over five years (assumption) 76–280 MW a year. At Rp1.25–2.5 billion per MW (assumption, from the job prices at about 150 MW each), Rp95–700 billion a year. At a 25–50% share (assumption), Rp24–350 billion a year.
  • Market size: total Rp0.8–6 trillion a year (0.64–2.4 GW a year [5] × Rp1.25–2.5 trillion per GW). Serviceable Rp0.2–2.4 trillion (25–40%, assumption). Attainable year-5 revenue Rp40–360 billion (20% of the low, 15% of the high, assumption, on a path from West Java to Batam and Central Java estates, which is inferred). Our narrowed low end for the first market (Rp24 billion, against the commissioned research’s Rp45 billion) makes the low end of these ranges weaker than it looks.
  • Estate land (illustration): Rp4.3 million per sqm × 100,000 sqm = Rp430 billion. Land also rose on general demand, and the source is an unnamed report in a broker’s note [3].

Strategy details

Dated Connection Contractor. Decisive assumption: on real projects outside PLN’s largest customers, customer-side works rather than upstream capacity, land or approvals set the switch-on date often enough to make a time advantage worth buying. This test asks whether the idea matters to the buyer. Method: reconstruct timelines for five to eight West Java projects and request PLN’s customer-build terms. Comparator: the same projects’ actual sequence. Measure: the step that last set the date, and the months between customer-side completion and upstream readiness. Weakened if upstream, land or approvals set the date on more than half, or PLN will not state terms. Partners and their reasons: equipment makers (forward orders, against a deposit); PLN (wants investment moving and says it compensates builders; its acceptance of a new contractor is unverified); civil and cable subcontractors (contract margin). Any PLN compensation stays with the operator, not the contractor. Licensing and PLN qualification details remain to be verified.

Estate Shared Substation. The estate owner pays a contractor for staged shared works and recovers through land prices or a connection charge; PLN keeps allocation, upstream capacity and acceptance. Largest potential because the buyer repeats. Decisive assumption: owners would pay because power readiness raises what land sells for. Test: three estate-manager interviews and a priced staged proposal, against a PLN-built connection. Weakened if estates say PLN funds all substations and none will pay.

Mobile Substation Bridge. A provider owns mobile units and rents them to serve a first phase where upstream capacity exists but the permanent substation is not ready, moving on once it is. It removes build time and creates no upstream capacity. PLN praises the idea [5], but PLN may deploy its own, and Elsewedy may rent directly [12]. Unit and rental prices were not found, and useful life beyond FY28–29 is unclear [3]. Decisive assumption: PLN will let a third party’s unit connect and charge for it. Test: a written question to PLN’s account team and a maker’s quotation; weakened if PLN refuses or payback needs more use than the gap provides.

Best to investigate first: Dated Connection Contractor, because the timeline review is cheap and informs all three. Largest potential: Estate Shared Substation.

Routes considered

  • Financing connection works (leases, milestone loans, zero-advance funds, payment on commercial operation): the works are too small a share of campus cost for freed capital to drive a switch. Finished assets may go to PLN, leaving no clear collateral. The compensation terms are unpublished.
  • Buying a place in PLN’s queue: no source shows PLN sells sequence, and upstream limits are physical.
  • Removing or pre-certifying PLN’s testing and approvals: a contractor cannot deliver this, and an operating certificate is required before connection [14].
  • A registry appointing contractors at contract signing: needs a mandate a new company cannot create.
  • Delay insurance, escrow and standby generation: treated as variants. Insurance is unverified, escrow is a payment term, and generation cost looks far above the Rp997 per kWh tariff for large users [3].
  • Modular substations, repeat designs, parallel approvals: methods the featured contractor would use, not separate businesses.
  • Partner on investor-built 500 kV lines [8]: deferred; it needs far more capital, land acquisition and competition with global contractors.

Open questions

  • What are PLN’s terms for customer-built works, and who owns the asset afterwards? (PLN’s account teams.)
  • Which step set the date on recent projects outside the largest customers? (Operators, contractors, former PLN staff.)
  • What capacity did the priced jobs serve, and what did delivery cost in Indonesia? (Contractors.)
  • Are directly hired contractors already offering date commitments to private operators? (Operators, Elsewedy.) Our searches found none, which is not evidence of absence.
  • Who funded recent estate substations? (Estate managers.)

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