When a forest village in East Kalimantan protects its trees, the World Bank pays for it. The payment is a results payment: money for cuts in forest emissions that have been independently verified, US$20.9 million as an advance so far and up to US$110 million by 2028 [2] [3]. Part of it goes to 591 villages, urban wards, community groups and customary communities as fixed sums of roughly Rp350–380 million each, about US$22,000–24,000 [2] [3]. Indonesia’s government, not the World Bank, decides who gets what.
On 11 November, Uli Arta Siagian, a national campaign coordinator at the environmental group WALHI, said that climate money “never reaches those who guard” the forest [1]. East Kalimantan’s books tell a different story. In 2024 Kemitraan, the non-profit that carries this money to the villages and groups, handled Rp119 billion. It passed Rp103 billion, 86.5%, straight to them. Of the 13.5% it kept, almost nine-tenths paid for the field work the programme requires; its own fee was Rp1.77 billion [2]. That matters for anyone hoping to found a leaner, cheaper intermediary: there is very little margin to undercut.
How a village gets its share
The money cannot simply be handed out. It may only be spent on activities that support keeping the forest, “not, for example, buying a car”, as a provincial planning official put it [2]. So each recipient must write a proposal for how it will use the money, and a team made up entirely of provincial government staff checks it [2].
Most villages need help to do that, and to go through the consent process the World Bank’s safeguard rules require for communities (often called FPIC, free, prior and informed consent). The government therefore appoints an intermediary institution, a lembaga perantara or “lemtara”, paid out of the programme. “We prepare the recipients, draft the proposals with them and accompany them,” said Hasbi Berliani, Kemitraan’s programme director [2]. The money itself does not pass through the intermediary for villages: BPDLH, the state environment fund that holds it, transfers it straight to each village’s account [2].
How a village’s forest-carbon payment moves
- 1. World Bank pays for results
US$20.9 million advance for verified emission cuts; up to US$110 million by 2028 - 2. BPDLH holds the money
The state environment fund pays it out under a benefit-sharing plan - 3. Intermediary prepares recipients
Kemitraan runs consent meetings and drafts proposals with villages and groups - 4. Province checks proposals
A team of provincial government staff verifies each proposal - 5. Money reaches the village
BPDLH transfers about Rp350–380 million to each village account - 6. Village spends and reports
Seedlings, training and other approved activities; books closed by December
Liu Mulang, a village in the upland district of Mahakam Ulu, shows how one share moves. Its head, Hendrikus Helaq, discussed the project with residents after a briefing in 2023 before agreeing to take part. About Rp378 million arrived at the end of 2024 and went into the village budget. Residents drafted proposals with help from facilitators of the national village-development programme, who are paid by the state, and others; the money bought fruit and cocoa seedlings and training for farmer groups. Because the transfer came so late, the village had to rush to spend it and close its books by December [2].
Where the 13.5% goes
The intermediary’s share sounds like money skimmed off before it reaches the forest. Kemitraan’s 2024 accounts, cited by Mongabay Indonesia, split it differently [2]:
Where the money Kemitraan handled in 2024 went
Spread over the 591 recipients it serves, that is about Rp27 million (about US$1,700) per village or group: roughly Rp24 million for the field work and Rp3 million of fee. The fee is about 1% of what a village receives. The plain mechanism is this: the payer reimburses the intermediary for the visits, training and consent meetings the rules require and adds a small fee, so most of the “cut” is the work itself. The delays villagers notice come from when BPDLH and the province release the money, which the intermediary does not control [2].
The tempting company: a cheaper local intermediary
The business this suggests is a District-Resident Facilitation Pool: a company whose facilitators live in the districts rather than flying in, shared across the forest-carbon programme, Green Climate Fund payments that BPDLH sends to East Kalimantan through other intermediaries, and donor grants in the same villages [4]. It would bid in the government’s call for intermediaries at a lower price. In practice, one facilitator based in a district town would look after about a dozen villages and groups: visit each over several days a year, run the consent meetings, help draft its proposal, prepare it for the province’s check and write the reports. The government would pay the company per recipient, as it pays Kemitraan now.
For the government to switch, the company must do that work for clearly less than Kemitraan. The research we built on priced a resident team from the government’s own travel and vehicle-rental cost ceilings and the provincial minimum wage, with staffing and overhead assumed: about Rp24.5 million per recipient a year [5] [9]. That is slightly more than Kemitraan’s reported Rp24.1 million cost. Adding a margin like Kemitraan’s own (its fee is 12.4% of its costs) takes the newcomer’s price to about Rp27.5 million, more than the incumbent’s Rp27.1 million. If a facilitator can manage only eight recipients instead of twelve, the newcomer’s cost rises by almost Rp6 million each (our calculation in the notes). On the published numbers, the most a newcomer could save the government is part of the Rp3 million fee per recipient.
Three more things weigh against it. Villages already have a free helper: the state-paid village-development facilitators who helped Liu Mulang write its proposal [2]. The 2026 call for intermediaries is addressed to institutions with experience accompanying villages, groups or customary communities in East Kalimantan [3], which a new company does not have; we found no rule saying whether companies may bid or whether price is scored. And the work is tied to one programme: the province plans to absorb the full payment, received by BPDLH in December 2025, in stages through 2028 [2]. In the busiest year so far, the whole intermediary portion for these recipients was about Rp16 billion. A newcomer winning a share of it would have a thin, temporary business and no evident advantage the incumbent could not match by hiring local staff itself.
Would everyone it needs go along? The government would gain at most a small saving, set against the risk of an untested provider. Villages and groups gain nothing they do not get today: the money reaches their accounts directly either way. Kemitraan would rationally answer a challenge by hiring local facilitators or trimming its fee. None of these gives a new company a reason to exist.
What could still change the answer
The case for a company rests on one unknown: how Kemitraan’s Rp14.26 billion of field costs splits between head-office staff, flights and travel to remote districts, and the consent and training work itself. Nobody has published that breakdown. If a large part is travel and staff a resident team would avoid, so that the work cost nearer Rp18 million per recipient, a bid at about Rp21 million would save the government several billion rupiah a year and could win the call. The cheapest way to find out is to ask Kemitraan or the provincial government for the operating-cost lines of the 2024 accounts that Mongabay cites, and to ask the ministry’s call for its eligibility rules and scoring sheet. Former facilitators and finance staff of the 2024–2025 work, and BPDLH’s procurement team, could answer both questions quickly.
So could a cheaper local company handle these payments? Not on today’s evidence. What is documented: 86.5% of the money the main intermediary handled in 2024 (80.7% in 2025) reached villages and groups, and its fee was Rp1.77 billion. What we infer: the rest mostly pays for required work at about cost, so a newcomer has little to undercut. What remains unknown and decisive: the cost breakdown, whether a company may bid, and whether results payments continue after 2028.
What has to be true
The business described above stands on these claims, listed in the order we would test them.
- A resident team could do the intermediary’s field work for clearly less than Kemitraan’s reported Rp24.1 million operating cost per recipient
Not yet tested · the entrant
only modelled at government cost ceilings, with labour and density assumed [2] [5]
Would break if: Kemitraan’s cost breakdown shows little inter-island travel or head-office cost to remove
Cheapest test: obtain the 2024 realisation document’s operating-cost lines from Kemitraan or the province - The intermediary call admits a company or company-backed partnership and gives price real weight
Not yet tested · BPDLH and KLH (payer)
the call names only ‘institutions’ with East Kalimantan experience [3]
Would break if: the call requires a nonprofit or scores experience only
Cheapest test: ask the call’s contact for the RFP scoring sheet and eligibility rules - Results payments to villages continue after 2028, so a company can outlive one programme
Not yet tested · funders
provincial absorption planned for 2026–2028 only [2]
Would break if: no new results-payment agreement is signed
Cheapest test: check BPDLH and KLH announcements for post-2028 results-payment agreements
Research Notes
The sources, calculations and evidence records behind this investigation. Numbered citations in the article link here; ↩ returns to the text.
Sources
[1] Dunia Energi, “Jangan Lagi Andalkan Mekanisme Pasar, Indonesia Harus Ubah Strategi Mitigasi Krisis Iklim”, 11 November 2026 ↩
Read in full. The story that prompted this investigation; source of Uli Arta Siagian’s statement (original: “uang itu tidak pernah sampai kepada mereka yang menjaga”).
[2] Mongabay Indonesia, “Menyelisik Dana Karbon Kalimantan Timur”, 22 October 2026 ↩
Read in full through a text copy of the page (the page itself blocked automated access). Collaborative reporting with Kaltim Post, intuisi.co and prolog.co.id. Supports the payment amounts, the split of Kemitraan’s 2024 and 2025 accounts (from Kemitraan’s realisation document as reported, not seen by us), the per-village sums, the proposal and verification process, the Liu Mulang account, the timing of transfers and the 2026–2028 absorption plan. Kemitraan’s operating-cost lines are not given.
[3] Ministry of Environment (KLH/BPLH), announcement of the call for interest and planned request for proposals for FCPF intermediaries, 3 February 2026 ↩
Read in full. Supports the US$20.9 million advance, the US$110 million potential, the 591 recipients (442 villages, 25 urban wards, 124 community groups including 7 customary communities) and the experience requirement. It does not state the legal form required or how bids are scored.
[4] Katadata, “Dana iklim internasional Rp253 miliar mengucur ke 10 provinsi, Kaltim terbesar”, 12 August 2026 ↩
Read in part (allocations and intermediaries by province), by the commissioned research. Supports Green Climate Fund results money reaching 10 provinces through BPDLH and named intermediaries such as Yayasan SATUNAMA and Perkumpulan Institut Samdhana, with East Kalimantan the largest allocation. Intermediaries’ shares are not published.
[5] Ministry of Finance, PMK 32/2025, input cost standards for the 2026 budget year ↩
Read in part (Annex I: daily allowance, lodging, field-vehicle rental and inland transport in East Kalimantan) by the commissioned research. These are government ceilings, used here as cost inputs for a field team.
[6] Mongabay, “Donors renew $1.8 billion pledge for Indigenous land rights”, November 2025
Read in full by the commissioned research. Context for donor money aimed at forest communities; used only in “routes considered”.
[7] Chronicle of Philanthropy, “6 Tips for Raising Money to Measure Impact”, 2019
Read in full by the commissioned research. Source of the rule of thumb that 5–10% of a programme budget goes to evaluation; a general guide, not an Indonesian figure.
[8] Mongabay, “Indonesian project shows how climate funding can go directly to IPLCs”, May 2023
Read in part by the commissioned research. Supports Dana Nusantara’s direct grants of about Rp50–100 million to Indigenous and local communities, administered by its own networks.
[9] Bisnis.com, “Daftar lengkap UMP 2026 di seluruh Indonesia”, 1 January 2026 ↩
Search summary only: East Kalimantan’s 2026 provincial minimum wage of Rp 3,762,431 a month. Used as the floor for facilitator pay.
[10] Yayasan Penabulu, procurement terms of reference for the national-level FCPF Carbon Fund results payment, 2024
Read in part (background section). The intermediary’s own document: it states that BPDLH appointed Penabulu as intermediary and that the procurement served 5 national-level recipients.
Who does this work today
| Provider | What it does | Price or scale | Whom it serves | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kemitraan (non-profit, appointed intermediary) | Prepares recipients, drafts proposals, runs consent meetings, accompanies and reports; transfers reward money to groups | 2024: Rp 16.04 bn portion = Rp 14.26 bn operating cost + Rp 1.77 bn fee; ≈ Rp 27.1 m per recipient | 417 villages, 24 urban wards, 143 groups, 7 customary communities in East Kalimantan | [2] |
| Yayasan Penabulu (non-profit, appointed intermediary) | Intermediary for national-level recipients of the advance payment | Rp 8.78 bn channelled in 2024; share not published | 5 national-level recipient bodies | [2] [10] |
| Yayasan SATUNAMA, Perkumpulan Institut Samdhana and other BPDLH intermediaries | Carry Green Climate Fund results money to communities | Not published | Communities in 10 provinces | [4] |
| Village-development programme facilitators (state-paid) | Help villages draft activity proposals | Paid from the national village programme; free to the village | Villages | [2] |
| Dana Nusantara (network fund) | Small direct grants, administered in-house | About Rp 50–100 m per grant | Communities in the AMAN, WALHI and KPA networks | [8] |
Evidence ledger
- Observed: 86.5% (2024) and 80.7% (2025) of what Kemitraan handled reached villages and groups; its 2024 portion split into Rp 14.26 bn of operating cost and Rp 1.77 bn of fee; transfers arrived near year-end [2]. The call targets institutions with East Kalimantan experience [3].
- Inferred: the operating cost is broadly the cost of the required work, since it is described as technical facilitation, training and consent work [2]; late transfers follow the payer’s budget calendar, since the intermediary neither verifies proposals nor transfers village money.
- Unknown and decisive: how the Rp 14.26 bn splits between staff, travel and field activities; whether a company can bid and whether price is scored; whether the full-payment phase has already been awarded (a provincial page of 5 September 2026 on selecting intermediaries was seen only as a search snippet).
- Correction to the research we built on: it treated the Rp 1.77 bn fee as additional to the Rp 16.04 bn portion (Rp 17.81 bn, ≈ Rp 30.1 m per recipient). The two figures in the source add up to the portion (14.26 + 1.77 = 16.03 ≈ 16.04), so the fee is inside it. It also assumed one paid cycle per recipient every year; the advance was one round paid out over 2024–2025.
Economics workings
Unit: one recipient (village, urban ward, community group or customary community) for one round of preparation, proposal, consent and reporting. Dollar figures use the source’s own rate: Rp 327.96 bn ÷ US$ 20.9 m ≈ Rp 15,700 per US$ [2].
| Step | Calculation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Kemitraan’s portion per recipient | Rp 16.04 bn ÷ 591 ≈ Rp 27.1 m | Sourced [2] [3] |
| Operating cost per recipient | Rp 14.26 bn ÷ 591 ≈ Rp 24.1 m | Sourced [2] |
| Fee per recipient | Rp 1.77 bn ÷ 591 ≈ Rp 3.0 m | Sourced [2] |
| Fee as a share of operating cost | Rp 1.77 bn ÷ Rp 14.26 bn ≈ 12.4% | Sourced [2] |
| Fee against one village’s payment | Rp 3.0 m ÷ Rp 349–378 m ≈ 0.8–0.9% | Sourced [2] |
| Newcomer: facilitator pay | Rp 6.0 m a month (≈ 1.6 × minimum wage Rp 3.76 m) × 12 ÷ 12 recipients = Rp 6.0 m | Assumed; wage floor [9] |
| Newcomer: daily allowance | 8 field days × Rp 430,000 = Rp 3.44 m | Government ceiling [5] |
| Newcomer: lodging | 4 nights × Rp 804,000 = Rp 3.22 m | Government ceiling [5] |
| Newcomer: transport | 8 trips × ≈ Rp 1.0 m ÷ 12 recipients ≈ Rp 0.67 m | Government ceiling [5] |
| Newcomer: field vehicle | Rp 16.14 m a month ÷ 3 facilitators × 12 ÷ 12 recipients ≈ Rp 5.38 m | Government ceiling [5] |
| Newcomer: supervision | 1 coordinator at Rp 15 m a month per 4 facilitators: Rp 180 m ÷ 48 recipients = Rp 3.75 m | Assumed |
| Newcomer: overhead | Rp 1.2 bn a year ÷ 591 ≈ Rp 2.03 m | Assumed |
| Newcomer: total cost | 6.0 + 3.44 + 3.22 + 0.67 + 5.38 + 3.75 + 2.03 ≈ Rp 24.5 m | Calculation |
| Newcomer price at Kemitraan’s margin | Rp 24.5 m × 1.124 ≈ Rp 27.5 m (against Rp 27.1 m) | Calculation |
| Weakest input: recipients per facilitator | At 8 instead of 12, pay and vehicle rise by ≈ Rp 5.7 m, cost ≈ Rp 30.2 m | Calculation |
| What would reopen it | Incumbent cost ≈ Rp 18 m; newcomer bids ≈ Rp 21 m; saving ≈ 591 × Rp 6.1 m ≈ Rp 3.6 bn a round | Illustration |
First market, counted from the buyer up. Buyers: one payer (the ministry and BPDLH with the province) contracting for 591 recipients [3] (sourced). How often: one round per payment; the advance round ran over 2024–2025 and the full payment is to be absorbed in 2026–2028 [2] (sourced; the number of rounds in the full-payment phase is not known). Value: ≈ Rp 27.1 m per recipient per round (sourced). Total: 591 × Rp 27.1 m ≈ Rp 16 bn per round. A newcomer winning one or two lots would earn a fraction of that, with a margin of about Rp 3 m per recipient at most. Green Climate Fund lots in East Kalimantan add more of the same work [4], but their prices are not published. What the payer spends today is sourced (Kemitraan’s 2024 accounts as reported) [2].
The tested business in detail
District-Resident Facilitation Pool. Provider: a company, possibly paired with a non-profit that holds the mandate if only non-profits may bid. Customer and payer: the ministry and BPDLH with the provincial government, paying per recipient from the programme’s management budget. Partners: village governments and the state village facilitators (they gain nothing new from switching); the provincial verification team (unchanged). Workflow: win a lot in the intermediary call; place facilitators in district towns; visit each recipient over about eight field days a year; run consent meetings; draft proposals with the village; submit for provincial verification; report to BPDLH and the World Bank safeguards monitors. Decisive assumption: the field work can be done well below Rp 24.1 m per recipient. Test: obtain the operating-cost lines of Kemitraan’s 2024 accounts and the call’s eligibility and scoring rules; the idea fails if travel and head-office costs are a small part of the total or if price carries little weight.
Routes considered
Folded into the District-Resident Facilitation Pool: sharing the same district team with Green Climate Fund lots; pairing a non-profit mandate holder with an operating company; and a roster of contracted rather than employed facilitators. None of them changes the cost comparison above.
- A readiness service that gets villages ready before the money arrives. The money comes late because of when BPDLH and the province release it, and readiness work is already part of the intermediary’s job, so no one would pay separately for it.
- Subcontracting field work to the existing intermediary. It pays only if the work can be done below Kemitraan’s own cost, and the whole fee to share is Rp 1.77 bn a year.
- Templates and digital tools to cut field visits. The consent meetings with customary communities still need people on the ground, and any saving is one Kemitraan can adopt as easily as a newcomer.
- Changing how and when the money is released (smaller instalments on proof of progress, a verification calendar aligned with district budgets). These are changes the government would have to make to its own programme, not a company someone could found.
- A verification service for donor grants to forest communities. Donors have renewed large pledges for Indigenous land rights [6], but a grant of Rp 50–100 m [8] at the usual 5–10% evaluation share [7] pays for only Rp 2.5–10 m of checking, and network funds such as Dana Nusantara keep administration in-house.
Open questions
- How is Kemitraan’s Rp 14.26 bn of 2024 operating cost divided between staff, travel and field activities? Kemitraan, the provincial government or former facilitators could answer.
- Does the full-payment call admit companies, and is price scored? BPDLH’s FCPF procurement team could answer; it may already have been awarded.
- Will new results-payment agreements follow after 2028? The ministry and BPDLH would announce them.
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