Could Riau’s oil-palm growers buy fertiliser now and pay for it from their next harvest?

On 12 November 2026, at Indonesia’s main palm-oil industry conference, Eddy Martono, head of Gapki, the association of palm-oil companies, said that in several regions oil-palm farmers were being forced by economic conditions, not by choice, to put off fertilising their trees, just as an El Niño drought threatened to cut national output by up to 3 million tonnes, mostly in 2027 [1]. Fertiliser is what keeps a mature palm producing the fruit bunches that mills crush for palm oil. The farmers skipping it are independent smallholders, who pay for every sack themselves.

The puzzle is in the arithmetic. The urea and potash needed to replace what one tonne of fruit takes out of the soil cost about Rp129,000 at June 2026 shop prices, while that tonne sells for about Rp3.8 million in Riau, Indonesia’s largest palm province [7][9][2]. The inputs cost about 3% of what they help earn, yet growers go without, because the fertiliser has to be paid for in cash months before the fruit it feeds is sold. This article asks whether a company could supply fertiliser now and collect payment later, out of the fruit money, at the mill.

We have written about these growers before: our 16 November article asked whether a company could get them the price mills pay partnered farmers, and noted that such a company would need input loans repaid from mill receipts [16]. This is that missing piece, examined as a business of its own: what is sold here is fertiliser on credit, not better fruit prices.

A sack of urea and a tonne of fruit

A smallholder in Riau typically farms about 2.4 hectares of palms [6]. Nationally, about 2.9 million such farmers manage 6.94 million hectares, and Riau alone has about 3.39 million hectares of palm of all kinds [6]. Every couple of weeks the grower cuts ripe fruit bunches and sells them, usually to a village collector (a toke) who trucks them to a mill. Twice a year, the trees need fertiliser: mainly urea (nitrogen) and potash (sold as KCl or MOP), bought by the 50 kg sack from a village farm-supply shop, a kios, for cash. Fertiliser makes up roughly 30% of a palm grower’s production cost, according to the agriculture ministry’s research agency [7].

Oil palm gets no help with that bill. The government’s subsidised fertiliser goes to food crops and a few others; palm and rubber are expressly excluded [3][2]. So palm growers pay commercial prices, which rose sharply in 2026. In June a national price round-up listed urea at Rp500,000 a sack (about US$30), up from Rp460,000, potash at Rp450,000 and NPK blends at Rp750,000–850,000 [2]. A farmer group in Bengkalis, Riau, told the state broadcaster RRI it was paying Rp930,000 for a sack of NPK that had cost Rp700,000 [4]. Upstream fertiliser prices rose by up to 30% after China restricted exports in March [5], and in October the army seized tens of tonnes of allegedly hoarded fertiliser in Riau [15]. Those shop prices are what these buyers already spend; nobody needs to be persuaded that fertiliser is worth buying.

How fertiliser and fruit money move today

  1. 1. Shop sells for cash
    Urea Rp500,000 a sack; palm gets no subsidy
  2. 2. Grower fertilises (or defers)
    Twice a year, timed to rain
  3. 3. Fruit harvested
    Cut every couple of weeks, months later
  4. 4. Collector buys fruit
    Below the set price; may advance cash
  5. 5. Mill pays the collector
    At or near the reference price
Cash for fertiliser leaves the grower months before the fruit money comes back; the collector is the only lender in the chain.Based on sources [2] [3] [10] and our own reasoning.

Who lends to a palm grower today

The problem in one sentence: the money to pay for fertiliser arrives with the fruit, but the shop wants cash before it, and the only party that sees the fruit money and lends against it is the collector, who charges for that through a lower fruit price.

The collector’s terms are not small. In October 2022 the news site detik reported a grower in Pekanbaru, Riau’s capital, being paid Rp2,175 a kilo at a collection point while the provincial plantation office had set Rp2,660; the grower had no farmer group or partnership to sell through [10]. Riau’s plantation office publishes that reference price every week; for fruit from 10- to 20-year-old palms it was Rp3,826.84 a kilo for 30 September to 6 October 2026 [9]. Growers outside a company partnership sell at whatever the collector offers [10]. A collector’s advance is therefore fast, familiar and expensive, and it is paid for in every kilo sold afterwards.

The formal alternatives reach few of these growers. Koltiva, an agri-tech company that runs supply-chain traceability programmes for buyers of palm oil and other crops, describes buy-now-pay-later inputs supplied through kiosks and fintech partners and repaid at harvest [11]; it reports more than 170,000 registered palm smallholders across 13 provinces including Riau [12]. But the only fertiliser lending it quantifies is a coffee case, 41,200 kg for 136 farmers [11], and its fees are unpublished. Pupuk Indonesia, the state fertiliser producer, runs Program Makmur, which bundles fertiliser, bank financing and a guaranteed buyer for selected farmer groups; it reported 451,537 hectares across all crops by December 2024 [14], and a 2022 report named Riau palm projects in Rokan Hulu, Kampar and Kuantan Singingi covering 6,841 hectares [13]. Against 6.94 million hectares of smallholder palm, both are thin. Whether either operates in the particular mill catchments a new company would choose is unknown, and checking the mill’s supplier list against their registrations is one of the first jobs.

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The kios cannot lend because it has no way to collect from fruit sales. A bank or fintech lender cannot cheaply reach thousands of scattered growers who often lack land titles. That leaves the toke, the do-nothing option of cutting doses, and the drought on top: the agriculture ministry advises dry-season fertilising to be timed to rain [8], which means cash has to be on hand at short notice.

Fertiliser now, paid from the fruit

The business we examine, Mill-repaid fertiliser credit for grower groups, would sit between the bulk fertiliser trade and the mill. Here is one order, start to finish, under the arrangement we propose (a hypothetical built on the sourced prices and farm size; the fee and timings are our assumptions):

  1. A grower with 2.4 hectares joins a group of five to ten neighbours who all sell fruit to the same independent mill. A village coordinator, paid per member signed up, handles enrolment.
  2. Ahead of the rains, the group orders one application: about 15 sacks of urea and potash per member. The company buys in bulk from a distributor, stores it at a depot near the mill, and delivers coded sacks to the village drop point when rain allows.
  3. The grower pays nothing on delivery. The price is the shop price plus a stated fee of about 5% for roughly five months’ credit: about Rp525,000 for a sack of urea that costs Rp500,000 in cash.
  4. Each time the grower’s fruit crosses the mill weighbridge, the mill deducts an agreed share of the payment and remits it to the company until the order is repaid. In a poor month the deduction shrinks with the delivery; the group follows up members who fall behind.

Why would a grower switch? For access: fertiliser on the day it can be applied, without cash on hand. For price: a disclosed fee instead of a collector’s discount on every kilo. For quality: verified sacks from a known supplier in a province where hoarded fertiliser has made the news [15]. The fee looks large against a sack but small against the fruit: on the nutrient-replacement figures above, 5% on Rp129,000 of fertiliser is about Rp6,500 per tonne of fruit, about 0.2% of its value [7][9].

The mill is the essential partner. It already weighs and pays for every delivery, so it is the only place where collection costs almost nothing. What it gains is steadier, better-fertilised fruit supply from its catchment in a year when Gapki expects output to fall [1]; what it takes on is paperwork, and possibly pressure to pay organised groups closer to the reference price. Farmer groups have their own reason to go along: a 2020 Riau governor’s regulation (Pergub 77/2020) lets independent growers organised in groups partner with mills to obtain the official price, and a working supply-and-repayment arrangement with a mill is a step towards that [10].

The proposed order, start to finish

  1. 1. Group orders
    Five to ten neighbours selling to one mill
  2. 2. Bulk purchase and depot
    Near the partner mill
  3. 3. Delivery when rain allows
    Coded sacks, nothing paid on delivery
  4. 4. Mill deducts
    A share of each fruit delivery
  5. 5. Repaid
    Shop price plus about 5%, over about five months
One application for one grower group under the business we examine; fee and timings are our assumptions.Illustration from stated assumptions.

The number nobody has published

The grower’s willingness to pay is the easy part. The business is decided on the supply side, by what bulk fertiliser costs to land in a Riau catchment, and we found no published 2026 bulk or distributor price, only shop prices [2][4].

So the per-sack economics are built on assumptions. If bulk product lands about 10% below the Rp500,000 shop price, and transport, five months of finance, losses on unpaid loans, and field staff are added, a delivered sack of urea costs the company about Rp518,000. At Rp525,000 it earns about Rp7,000 a sack, around 1%. If bulk product lands 15% below the shop price, the margin rises to about Rp32,000, around 6%. If it lands only 8% below, the company loses money on every sack. Matching the cash shop price while lending, which looks like the obvious offer, loses money in the central case. The first test is therefore cheap: written delivered quotes for 100 tonnes from two or three distributors.

What a delivered sack of urea would cost the company

Cash shop priceRp500,000
Company’s delivered cost (central)about Rp518,000
Proposed credit priceabout Rp525,000
Central case: bulk product 10% below the shop price. The company’s cost sits above the cash shop price, which is why matching it loses money.Based on sources [2] and our own reasoning.

The first market is also assumption-heavy, but simple to check. One to three mill catchments of 10,000–20,000 hectares each of independent mature palm would hold about 12,500–25,000 growers at 2.4 hectares each [6]. Each buys twice a year, spending in total about Rp5–8 million per hectare a year at the recommended dose and June shop prices, allowing for growers who apply less than recommended [7][2]. That is about Rp150–480 billion (US$9–29 million) of fertiliser bought in the first catchments each year. Supplying a tenth to a quarter of those hectares by year three would mean Rp15–120 billion in sales, but at a 1–6% margin only about Rp0.2–7 billion a year before overheads. A dedicated company works only at the upper end: the bulk discount has to be real, losses low, and the model repeated across several catchments, then into Jambi, North Sumatra and Kalimantan.

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Where it breaks

The strongest case against it: if bulk product lands within about 8% of shop prices, the credit costs more than the margin, and a collector can match the offer by advancing a little more. Drought makes losses arrive together, in the same year, across the same catchment. A mill could refuse to deduct, or ask for a fee that takes the margin. And once the arrangement works, the mill itself, Koltiva or a Makmur project could copy it. What the company would hold by then is its repayment record in each catchment and its group network, which would let it borrow and buy more cheaply than a newcomer; the product itself is a commodity.

The team that could test this is a Sumatra fertiliser distributor or a mill-backed service company, with a local rural bank (BPR) or agricultural fintech willing to fund four- to six-month advances. An outsider without trading contacts would struggle to get the bulk price that decides everything.

In short, it is documented that palm growers pay full shop prices in cash, are excluded from subsidy, and that some are deferring fertiliser; it is our inference that harvest-linked credit collected at the mill would bring them back to the shop shelf, and it is unknown whether bulk product lands cheaply enough and a mill will deduct. A delivered quote for 100 tonnes and one mill’s signed letter would settle most of it.

What has to be true

The business described above stands on these claims, listed in the order we would test them.

  1. Bulk-bought urea and potash can be landed in a Riau catchment at least 10-15% below kios retail
    Not yet tested · Fertiliser suppliers
    No bulk or distributor price for 2026 was found; only retail sack prices [2] [4]
    Would break if: Written quotes for 100 t delivered come within about 8% of kios retail
    Cheapest test: Ask two or three distributors or importers for written delivered quotes for 100 t of urea and potash to a Kampar or Rokan Hulu mill
  2. An independent mill will deduct fertiliser repayments from growers’ fruit payments and pass them on
    Not yet tested · Partner mill
    Would break if: The mills approached refuse or demand a fee that removes the margin
    Cheapest test: Ask three independent mills in one catchment for a signed letter of intent on deduction and remittance
  3. Cash-short growers will accept a fee of about 5% over cash retail and route their fruit through the partner mill
    Not yet tested · Growers
    They already pay Rp450,000-930,000 per sack in cash and take toke advances tied to a lower price [2] [4] [10]
    Would break if: Fewer than about a third of growers offered the terms sign up
    Cheapest test: Make a priced written offer to 50 growers in two villages and count sign-ups
  4. Grouped growers repay harvest-linked fertiliser credit with losses below about 5% even in a drought year
    Not yet tested · Lender
    [1]
    Would break if: Repayment records from comparable deduction schemes show losses above 5% in dry years
    Cheapest test: Obtain repayment records from a plasma cooperative or company scheme that already deducts input loans from fruit payments
  5. A lender will fund four- to six-month advances at no more than about 12% a year
    Not yet tested · Lender
    Would break if: Term sheets price the money above 12% or require collateral growers lack
    Cheapest test: Request term sheets from a BPR and one agricultural fintech for a mill-deducted portfolio
  6. Most growers in the chosen catchment are not already covered by Koltiva’s input credit or a Makmur project
    Our inference from the sources · Growers
    Makmur covered 451,537 ha across all crops by Dec 2024; Koltiva’s quantified fertiliser lending is a coffee case [11] [13] [14] [6]
    Would break if: The mill’s supplier list shows most growers already registered with either scheme
    Cheapest test: Match the partner mill’s supplier list against Koltiva and Makmur registrations

Research Notes

The sources, calculations and evidence records behind this investigation. Numbered citations in the article link here; ↩ returns to the text.

Sources

[1] Katadata: Petani Sawit Tunda Pemupukan, Produksi 2027 Terancam Turun (12 Nov 2026) ↩

Opening: Gapki statement on deferred fertilising and El Niño output risk. Read in full.

[2] APGtimes: Daftar Harga Pupuk Subsidi dan Non Subsidi Juni 2026 (12 Jun 2026) ↩

Non-subsidised fertiliser prices, June 2026; palm and rubber buy non-subsidised fertiliser. Read in full; a national round-up, not a Riau price survey.

[3] Tabloid Sinar Tani: Permentan 15/2025 turunan Perpres 6/2025 resmi berlaku (11 Jun 2025) ↩

Permentan 15/2025: oil palm not among subsidised commodities. Read in full.

[4] RRI Bengkalis: Harga Pupuk NPK Naik 20 Persen (June 2026) ↩

Bengkalis farmer group reports NPK at Rp930,000 per 50 kg sack; the crop is not stated. Read in full.

[5] Katadata: Industri Sawit Dibayangi Kenaikan Biaya Pupuk dan Logistik (3 Aug 2026) ↩

Upstream fertiliser prices up to 30% higher after China restricted exports. Read in full.

[6] Republika: Sebaran sawit nasional terkonsentrasi di enam provinsi utama (3 Dec 2025; Ditjenbun figures for 2022) ↩

Ditjenbun 2022 figures: 2.9m smallholders on 6.94m ha; Riau 3.39m ha of palm. Read in full.

[7] BRMP Babel (Kementan): Penerapan standar pemupukan kelapa sawit ↩

Kementan research agency: nutrients removed per tonne of fruit; fertiliser about 30% of production cost; recommended doses. Read in full.

[8] Ditjenbun Kementan: mitigasi kemarau kelapa sawit (Jul 2026) ↩

Ditjenbun: dry-season advice to time fertilising to rainfall. Read in full.

[9] InfoPublik: Harga TBS Riau mitra swadaya 30 Sep-6 Oct 2026 (Disbun Riau) ↩

Riau reference price for fruit from 10–20-year-old palms, 30 Sep–6 Oct 2026. Read in full.

[10] detik: Disbun tetapkan harga tinggi, harga sawit di tingkat petani justru rendah (27 Oct 2022) ↩

Collector price versus set price (Pekanbaru, 2022); non-partnered growers sell at the collector’s price; partnership rules. Read in full; 2022 data.

[11] Koltiva: Why closed-loop financial inclusion is the missing link in smallholder input access ↩

Koltiva: input buy-now-pay-later model; coffee fertiliser lending case. Read in full; the company’s own account.

[12] Koltiva: Ensuring sustainability and transparency in Indonesia’s palm oil supply chain (Aug 2024) ↩

Koltiva: palm traceability coverage. Read in full; the company’s own account.

[13] Kontan: Kementerian BUMN dorong Program Makmur untuk jawab keluhan petani sawit (8 Jan 2022) ↩

Kontan: Program Makmur palm projects in Riau (2022). Read in full.

[14] Pupuk Indonesia: Program Makmur (21 Jan 2025) ↩

Pupuk Indonesia: Program Makmur coverage by December 2024. Read in full; the company’s own account.

[15] Kompas: TNI bongkar dugaan penimbunan pupuk di Riau, puluhan ton disita (5 Oct 2026) ↩

Kompas: alleged fertiliser hoarding seized in Riau, October 2026. Read in full.

[16] What Could Work: Could a company get Riau’s independent oil-palm growers the price mills pay their partners? (16 Nov 2026) ↩

Our earlier article on partner prices for the same growers.

Competitors and substitutes

Who Offering Price In the first catchments?
Village kios (cash) Non-subsidised urea, KCl, NPK by the sack Urea Rp500,000; KCl Rp450,000; NPK Rp750,000–930,000 [2][4] Yes [4]
Collectors (toke) Cash for fruit; informal advances Fruit bought below the set price, e.g. Rp2,175 vs Rp2,660/kg (2022) [10] Yes [10]
Koltiva Inputs on buy-now-pay-later via kiosks and fintech partners, traceability Unpublished Unknown; palm traceability in Riau [12]
Program Makmur (Pupuk Indonesia) Fertiliser, financing and offtake for selected groups Unpublished Unknown; Riau palm projects in 2022 [13]
Plantation-company partnerships Input support for partnered growers Unknown Unknown (search summaries only)
Government grants; subsidised KUR bank loans Free inputs for eligible groups; documented loans Free; reported low interest Rationed; need documents (search summaries only)
Cutting or deferring fertiliser Saves cash now Lost yield later Widespread, per Gapki [1]

Economics workings

Step Calculation Status
Urea price per kg Rp 500,000 ÷ 50 kg = Rp 10,000/kg Sourced [2]
Potash (KCl) price per kg Rp 450,000 ÷ 50 kg = Rp 9,000/kg Sourced [2]
Nutrients removed per tonne of fruit 6.3 kg urea + 7.3 kg MOP (plus TSP and kieserite, not costed) Sourced [7]
Cost to replace them 6.3 × Rp 10,000 + 7.3 × Rp 9,000 = Rp 63,000 + Rp 65,700 ≈ Rp 129,000 Estimate
Value of one tonne of fruit Rp 3,826.84/kg × 1,000 kg ≈ Rp 3.83m Sourced [9]
Share of fruit value Rp 129,000 ÷ Rp 3.83m ≈ 3.4% Estimate
5% credit fee per tonne of fruit 5% × Rp 129,000 ≈ Rp 6,500 ≈ 0.2% of fruit value Estimate on an assumed fee
Bulk product per urea sack 8–15% below Rp 500,000 = Rp 425,000–460,000 (central Rp 450,000) Assumption; no bulk price found
Transport to catchment Rp 10,000–20,000 per sack Assumption
Finance 6–12% a year for about 6 months on about Rp 440,000 = Rp 13,000–28,000 Assumption
Losses on unpaid loans 3–5% = Rp 13,000–23,000 Assumption
Field staff, enrolment and collection Rp 10,000–20,000 per sack Assumption
Delivered cost per sack Rp 471,000–551,000; central ≈ Rp 518,000 Estimate on assumptions
Contribution at Rp 525,000 Central ≈ Rp 7,000 (1%); at 15% bulk discount ≈ Rp 32,000 (6%); at 8% discount negative Estimate on assumptions
Growers in first catchments 30,000–60,000 ha ÷ 2.39 ha = 12,500–25,000 growers (2.39 = 6.94m ha ÷ 2.9m farmers) Farm size sourced [6]; catchment area assumed
Spend per hectare About 13 sacks of urea and potash a year at the recommended dose; Rp 5–8m per ha a year allowing for partial application and other nutrients Assumption on [7][2]
First-market spend 12,500–25,000 growers × 2 purchases × Rp 6.0–9.6m = Rp 150–480bn a year Estimate on assumptions
Sales by year 3 10–25% of hectares: 3,000–15,000 ha × Rp 5–8m = Rp 15–120bn Assumption
Contribution before overheads 1–6% × Rp 15–120bn ≈ Rp 0.2–7bn a year Estimate

Exchange rate used for the dollar equivalents: about Rp 16,500 per US$. The weakest input is the bulk landed price. National figures are context only; the first-market count must be confirmed from a partner mill’s supplier list.

How the featured business would run

Mill-repaid fertiliser credit for grower groups: a distributor-lender buys urea, potash and NPK in bulk, keeps them in a depot near one independent mill, delivers coded sacks to grower groups of five to ten when rain allows, and collects repayment as a share of each fruit delivery deducted at the mill weighbridge. Partners: a bulk supplier (volume), the mill (steadier, better-fertilised supply), a BPR or fintech lender (repayment collected at source), farmer groups (partnership status and member benefits) and village coordinators (paid per member and per collected delivery). A small reserve contribution in each loan absorbs drought-year losses across catchments.

Routes considered

Folded into the featured business: bulk procurement through a depot at the mill gate; a deduction ledger at the weighbridge; rain-timed delivery of verified, coded sacks; a group price that falls as more neighbours join; peer follow-up inside small groups; instalments set as a share of each delivery; a shared reserve for drought losses; and enrolment through village coordinators. Partnering with the plantation office so groups receive the set fruit price, using kios as paid drop points, and collecting by buying the fruit oneself are variants of the same business.

  • Weather-triggered drought cover for input loans: no such product is shown to be sold for palm smallholders in Riau, and its premium would eat a margin of a few per cent.
  • Forward contracts and seasonal stockpiling: this turns a thin-margin supplier into a bet on fertiliser prices, which swung sharply in 2026.
  • A share of the extra yield instead of a fee: it pays nothing in exactly the drought years the business must survive, so no lender would fund it.
  • Repayment tied to a rainfall index: it needs a measured index and still leaves the lender short in a dry year; instalments that shrink with each delivery do the same job more simply.

Open questions

What bulk urea and potash cost delivered to a Kampar or Rokan Hulu mill (fertiliser distributors and importers); whether an independent mill will deduct and remit, and for what fee (mill managers); what a BPR or agricultural fintech would charge for a mill-deducted portfolio; what losses comparable deduction schemes suffered in dry years (plasma cooperatives and company schemes); and how many growers in a chosen catchment are already covered by Koltiva or Program Makmur. If you can answer one of these, we would like to hear from you.

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