Could a rented mill sell Indonesian rice traders a guaranteed premium grade?

Indonesia’s government held 4.56 million tonnes of rice in October 2026, yet medium-grade rice averaged Rp14,677 a kilo, above the official ceilings of Rp13,500 and Rp14,000. The think tank Indef listed several reasons. One of them was odd: subsidised rice was being repacked and sold as premium.^[1]

People repack rice when a label is worth money, and this one is. In September, mills sold premium rice for Rp15,185 a kilo on average and medium for Rp14,018, a gap of Rp1,167 before any shop added a margin.^[3] Most complaints about Indonesia’s small mills concern weight: how much rice comes out of a tonne of unmilled grain. Our sums point elsewhere. For a trader who owns grain and pays someone to mill it, the grade can be worth more than the extra kilos, and we found nobody selling that trader a promised grade.

That suggests a business we call Guaranteed-grade contract milling: rent an ordinary mill, add the machines it lacks, and charge more for a lab-tested result. It would not empty the government’s warehouses or lower shop prices. Whether traders would pay for it is the open question.

A tonne of paddy is worth more for its grade than its extra weight

Rice arrives at a mill as paddy: wet grain, still in its husk. The mill dries it, strips the husk and polishes the grain. At the mills surveyed in Pati, Central Java, about 55 kg of saleable rice came out of every 100 kg of paddy bought.^[5] The rest is husk, bran, which mills sell as a by-product, and whatever weight was water.

Some of the rice breaks on the way through, and broken grains decide the grade. The national standard allows premium rice at most 14.5% broken grains and medium rice at most 22%.^[9] A mill can raise the grade by handling the paddy gently and by removing broken grains afterwards, but the second step costs weight.

Now compare the two prizes, using September’s prices. One extra percentage point of weight means 10 kg more rice per tonne of paddy, worth about Rp140 for each kilo of paddy. Moving a batch, or lot, from medium to premium works differently. Take 555 kg of rice at the medium limit of 22% broken, and sort it down to 14.5%. That leaves about 506 kg of premium rice and 49 kg of broken grains, which we assume sell at Rp8,000–9,000 a kilo. The lot is then worth about Rp300–350 more per kilo of paddy, as much as two points or more of extra weight. This is our illustration, built on official prices and the published standard, and it describes no actual lot.

What one kilo of paddy can be worth at each step

A rented Pati mill’s whole profitabout Rp30

One extra point of weightabout Rp140

Java toll fee (our estimate)about Rp290

Moving a lot from medium to premiumRp300–350

Rupiah per kilo of paddy, all on the same basis. The premium step is the midpoint of Rp300–350. The Java toll fee is our estimate, scaled from 2013. The mill profit is from a 2023 survey of rented mills in Pati. Combines sourced figures and stated assumptions. Sources: ^[3] ^[5] ^[6] ^[9]

The studies we read also suggest that weight is where mills differ less. Government researchers put average recovery at 55.25% for small mills, 54.44% for medium and 56.00% for large.^[2] A test in Banyuwangi, East Java, found no statistically significant difference in weight between mobile village mills and large mills, but far more broken grains at the mobile ones: about 29% broken and 26% small broken, against about 14% and 12%.^[8] That test was old and small, using 12 kg batches, and the head of the millers’ association has claimed a wider weight gap for small mills.^[18] He also said only medium and large mills can make premium rice at all, leaving small ones at medium or below.^[18]

The label alone does not settle what is in the bag. When the agriculture ministry and police tested premium rice from 136 brands in June 2025, 85.56% of the samples did not comply with the rules.^[9]^[10] Those tests were not, as far as we can tell, a random survey of the market. They do show why a buyer might value a lot that comes with an independent test.

Toll mills charge for milling and promise nothing

Mills earn money in two ways. A merchant mill buys paddy and sells its own rice. A toll mill, or maklon, mills other people’s paddy for a fee, for farmers and for the collectors who buy from them.^[6] Some do both.

Toll mills are close by and cheap. One in Cianjur, West Java, charged Rp350,000 per tonne of rice in 2013, about Rp175 per kilo of paddy, and kept the husk and bran; adjusted for paddy prices we estimate about Rp290 today.^[6] Farmer groups in West Sumatra pay in rice, about 6–7.5% of what comes out, worth Rp375–728 per kilo of paddy.^[7] Those Cianjur machines were just a husker and a polisher, while the merchant mill in the same study had a dryer, a cleaner, double huskers and polishers, and a grader.^[6] Paid this way, a toll mill loses little when a lot comes out broken. We found no toll mill promising a grade.

This arrangement makes sense for almost everyone in it, and it leaves a particular person without a good choice. Picture a collector or regional rice seller who owns a few hundred tonnes of paddy a year. The alternatives look like this:

Sell the paddy unmilled. The state food agency Bulog has been paying a standard Rp6,500 a kilo for harvested paddy.^[20] That means cash now, and the milling profit goes to someone else.
Use a large mill. The 1,056 large mills reportedly absorb about 69% of paddy, and they buy it to sell as their own rice.^[2]^[16] The agriculture minister describes them outbidding small mills.^[17] We found no toll offer from them, though a search miss proves little. A large mill has no obvious reason to help a rival seller.
Rent or buy a line. Rented medium mills in Pati paid about Rp77 million a year in 2023.^[5] A mill owner told the president in 2021 that a line with a dryer cost about Rp400 million.^[21] That is sensible for an owner with steady volume, but a line that reliably makes premium costs more, and thin margins make the extra machines hard to pay for.^[2]

Others are helping mills rather than paddy owners. Bulog has enlisted private mills to re-process 2 million tonnes of its own rice into premium, says it now favours community-owned small mills, and from 2027 will give its toll work only to certified ones.^[11]^[13]^[14] The large rice company Wilmar Padi Indonesia launched a technology and technical-support programme in 2023 and was then working with about 92 mills.^[19] Government researchers propose shared dryers.^[2] The opening, then, is a hypothesis: owners too big for a village mill and too small to justify their own sorter and dryer, who would pay to have their own paddy milled to a known grade.

Renting a mill and selling a tested result

The company would rent an existing medium mill. Mill owners have a reason to agree: renting already happens in Pati, and the minister says small mills alone have capacity for 116 million tonnes of paddy against a harvest of about 65 million.^[5]^[17] To the base line it would add a cleaner, a dryer, a grader and a colour sorter, a machine that rejects discoloured grains. We assume that costs Rp1–1.5 billion per site, a figure still to be quoted.

How a lot would move through the proposed mill

1. Book and deliver
The owner books a harvest slot and delivers a weighed lot, and still owns it.
↓
2. Measure
Moisture, empty grain and weight are recorded; these set the fee tier and the promised result.
↓
3. Clean and dry
The paddy is cleaned and dried to 14% moisture within an agreed time.
↓
4. Mill and sort
The line is set for the rice variety; the lot is milled, graded and sorted.
↓
5. Test and return
A lab grades a sample; the owner gets rice, broken grains, a certificate and a lot record.
↓
6. Settle
The fee is settled against the contract, and the mill sells the bran.

Our description of the proposed service. No such operator was found or tested. Illustration from stated assumptions.

The owner never sells the paddy to the company. The company earns a fee, which we assume at Rp450–500 per kilo of paddy, and keeps the bran, as toll mills already do. If a lot misses the contracted grade or minimum weight, the fee falls towards the local toll price. That penalty is the promise: the mill now loses money when a lot comes out badly. Because it never buys paddy, the company does not bid against large mills and carries no stock of its own when rice prices move.

Measuring the paddy on arrival is what makes this fair, because paddy varies enormously. Bulog’s own purchases ranged from about 19% to 34% moisture.^[15] So wetter paddy pays a higher fee, and a lot too poor to reach the grade is priced as ordinary milling before any promise is made.

Sales would be door to door within hauling distance of each site, and the pitch is a trial on the owner’s own paddy. The first customers might be three to five collectors and regional sellers in one Java rice district. Pati has the best cost evidence. Each site would need a crew like the nine regular and four contract workers at Pati’s rented mills,^[5] and an engineer shared between sites. The natural founder is an experienced rice trader or mill manager with an engineer and access to equipment finance. A first-time team with no contacts in the trade would struggle.

What the sums look like for the owner and for the mill

The owner. Reaching premium is worth about Rp300–350 per kilo of paddy, and the fee costs up to about Rp210 more than our estimate of a Java toll fee, leaving roughly Rp90–140, plus about Rp140 for each extra point of weight, less any extra hauling. Where toll fees are already as high as West Sumatra’s, there is little or no fee premium to pay at all.

Everything depends on the price gap. Below about Rp530 a kilo, sorting pays nothing. A Rp100 fee premium needs a gap of about Rp750, and a Rp210 premium about Rp950, unless the line also delivers extra weight. In October the gap was about Rp1,120 by our calculation, and premium prices had risen 11.32% in a year against 5.57% for medium.^[3]^[4]

This is also a harvest business. A seller could simply buy premium rice from a large mill, and on September’s price that beats milling their own paddy once paddy costs more than about Rp7,600 a kilo. Bulog’s head said paddy was above Rp7,000–8,000 in October, outside the harvest.^[4] About 70% of the crop comes in the first half of the year, so that is when the arithmetic favours the owner.^[17] Size has a limit too: on our rough sums, an owner handling more than about 1,000 tonnes a year should rent or buy their own line with the same machines.

The mill. Here the Pati survey offers a surprise. Rented mills there spent about Rp270 per kilo of paddy on everything except the paddy, and sold bran worth about Rp200.^[5] After buying paddy and selling rice, they kept about Rp91 million on Rp20.7 billion of sales, about Rp30 per kilo of paddy.^[5] Add drying, cost increases since 2023, the new machines, lab tests and refunds, and we estimate Rp450–490 per kilo at 2,500 tonnes a year. Against a Rp500 fee plus bran, that leaves about Rp210–250, or roughly Rp530–620 million per site. A site would break even at about 1,200–1,500 tonnes. On paper, selling the service looks far better than trading paddy on a thin margin, provided those tonnes exist.

That proviso is serious. The Cianjur toll mill also looked excellent on paper, with revenue 3.7 times its costs, yet it milled at most 700 kg a day on a machine rated at 1,500 kg an hour, because its customers were few and household-sized.^[6] One case from 2013 proves nothing nationally, but it is the strongest evidence we have against this market.

The size of the first market. Indonesia has 7,332 medium mills and harvests about 65 million tonnes of paddy.^[16]^[17] Narrowing that to paddy passing through medium mills in Java and owned by someone other than the mill, on shares we partly assume, leaves roughly 1–1.9 million tonnes. Ten to twenty sites might earn Rp13–42 billion a year, including bran. Ten sites at 2,000 tonnes would about break even after head-office costs; twenty at 3,000 tonnes might make about Rp14 billion. These are scenarios and say nothing about demand. They describe a solid regional company, which could grow into other rice provinces and, if it can be certified, into Bulog’s toll work.

Bulog could close the gap, and other ways this fails

Bulog can flood the premium market. It has been ordered to make 300,000 tonnes of commercial premium rice to control prices, on top of the 2 million tonne re-milling programme.^[4]^[11] In June it proposed a premium programme at Rp14,900 a kilo, then unapproved.^[12] If mill prices for premium fell to that level with medium unchanged, the gap would be about Rp880: sorting would still pay, but a full fee premium would not without extra weight. No competitor in this market could do more damage, and the company could do nothing about it.

Good paddy may not need the machines. Bulog’s head said a partner mill in Demak made very good rice on simple machines because the paddy was good.^[22] If that is common, a careful local mill can match the grade for less. The reverse also holds: poor paddy makes poor rice, and 65.53% of what Bulog bought by September 2025 was below standard.^[15] A guarantee on such paddy could be costly.

Unbranded rice may not earn the gap. The official premium price probably reflects established sellers and their packaging, though we infer that from the reporting. A tested lot from an unknown seller may fetch less. Wilmar’s programme shows quality does change where rice can be sold and at what price,^[19] but no source we read shows a buyer paying an unbranded seller for a lab certificate.

The customers may be too small, and the idea is easy to copy. Nobody has counted how much paddy traders and cooperatives own and pay to have milled. Any capable mill owner can add a sorter once the results show, and surveyed Pati mills already carry government-backed loans.^[5] After three to five harvests, the company would hold records by rice variety and district, perhaps Bulog’s certificate, and some trust among buyers. That advantage can be repeated at new sites, but it could not stop a determined rival.

Three lots would settle most of it

The cheapest useful test needs no new mill. Take three owners in one Java rice district and split a 5–10 tonne lot from each. Half goes through a mill with a sorter, hired for the day, and half through the owner’s usual toll mill. An independent lab grades both, and two buyers quote a written price for each.

The idea weakens badly if the owner’s net gain is under about Rp250 per kilo of paddy on two of the three lots, or if no buyer will pay at least Rp750 above the same seller’s medium price. A second test follows after one harvest: can a site book 1,200 tonnes at Rp400 or more with those results in hand?

We have documented the price gap, the grade rules, what toll mills charge, and what Pati’s mills spend and earn. We have inferred that a toll mill has little reason to protect the grade, and that premium prices reflect a seller’s name as well as the grain. We do not know whether the same paddy reaches premium on this line, whether buyers will pay an unknown seller for it, or whether enough owners exist to fill a site. Rice traders with lots to split, mill operators with real toll costs, grain labs and buyers at regional distributors could answer those questions.

Research Notes

The sources, calculations and evidence records behind this investigation. Numbered citations in the article link here; ↩ returns to the text.

How the numbers were built

Status of the figures. Sourced figures carry citations. Everything else here is our estimate or assumption, as labelled. Prices from different years are not adjusted unless stated.

The grade step (illustration). 1,000 kg paddy × 55.5% = 555 kg rice at 22% broken, so 433 kg whole. To reach 14.5% broken: 433 ÷ 0.855 = 506 kg premium, removing 49 kg of broken grains. Value as medium: 555 × Rp14,018 = Rp7.78M. Value sorted: 506 × Rp15,185 = Rp7.68M, plus 49 kg × Rp8,000–9,000 (assumption) = Rp0.39–0.44M; total Rp8.08–8.13M. Gain Rp297–347/kg of paddy. One point of recovery: 10 kg × Rp14,018 = Rp140/kg of paddy (Rp152 at the premium price). The weakest input is the price and share of broken grains. Real lots may start with fewer or more than 22% broken.

Gap thresholds. Gain = 506 × gap − 49 × (Rp14,018 − Rp8,500), which is zero at a gap of about Rp534. It covers a Rp100 fee premium at about Rp730 and a Rp210 premium at about Rp950. The October gap is derived: September prices ^[3] with stated monthly changes of +0.01% and +0.35% ^[4] give about Rp15,187 and Rp14,067, a gap of about Rp1,120. The Rp880 scenario uses Rp14,900 against Rp14,018; Rp14,900 was proposed as a selling price, so it is a stress case and no forecast of mill prices.

Owner’s route against buying premium. Paddy cost plus a Rp500 fee, less broken grains sold at Rp8,500, per 506 kg of premium, equals Rp15,185/kg when paddy costs about Rp7,600/kg, before financing and hauling.

Toll fees. Cianjur: Rp350,000/t of rice at 50% recovery = Rp175/kg of paddy in 2013; its implied paddy cost was about Rp3,860/kg, so scaling to Rp6,500 gives about Rp290 (our estimate). West Sumatra: fee rows in the study’s Table 4 give Rp37,500–72,800 per 100 kg of paddy, a rice share of 2.8–4.5 kg on 40–65 kg of rice. One row in the table has a Rp800 internal inconsistency. We did not use that study’s farmer-reported recovery rise from 40% to 65%, which looks implausibly large.

Site economics (estimate). Rented Pati mill: total cost Rp20.60B − paddy Rp19.78B = Rp822M non-paddy, over 3,043 t = Rp270/kg. Its fuel, labour and sacks are for merchant work, and its dryer spending is tiny, so those mills probably buy dried paddy or sun-dry (inferred). We therefore add Rp61/kg dryer and power from Pati’s owned mills ((Rp137M + Rp122M) ÷ 4,247 t), an upper-bound proxy because power is shared. Rp331 × 1.15 (assumed drift since 2023) = Rp381. Add Rp70–105/kg for upgrade depreciation, lab tests and refunds (assumption) = Rp450–490/kg. Bran: 243,429 kg × Rp2,500 ÷ 3,043 t = Rp200/kg. Revenue Rp500 + Rp200 = Rp700/kg. Breakeven on about Rp600M fixed and Rp200/kg variable cost (illustrative): 1,200 t at a Rp500 fee, 1,500 t at Rp400. Hauling is not included, and these costs come from a purposive sample of merchant mills, not premium toll lines.

First market. Base: 7,332 medium mills (BPS 2020) ^[16] and about 65 Mt of paddy a year ^[17]; the 60 Mt low end is our assumption. × 21.4% through medium mills ^[2] × 53.4% in Java (a share of all mills, applied to medium volume as an assumption) ^[2] = 6.9–7.4 Mt. × 15–25% owned by non-mill parties (assumption, and the weakest input) = 1.03–1.86 Mt. At Rp450–500/kg that is about Rp465–930B a year in fees. A new company’s share: 10–20 sites × 2,000–3,000 t × Rp650–700/kg = Rp13–42B. Company scenarios assume a Rp2–3B head office. Applied to BPS counts, the ICASEPS absorption shares imply about 1,900 t/yr per medium mill and about 38 t/yr per small mill, whereas Pati’s medium mills ran 3,043–4,247 t/yr. They probably capture purchases and not toll work, so they are a weak base.

Market size for the changed business (IDR a year). Total job: Rp22.5–46.8T (60–65 Mt × Rp375–720/kg, an upper bound from the commissioned research, applied to paddy milled in-house as well). Serviceable: Rp1.25–2.43T (1.92–3.48 Mt × Rp650–700/kg). Year-5 company revenue: Rp26–84B (20–40 sites × 2,000–3,000 t × Rp650–700/kg, about 2–3.5% of serviceable, along an inferred path to other rice provinces). The site count and the non-mill share are assumptions.

Own-line breakeven (illustrative). Replacing a Rp500/kg fee: about 500 t/yr for a simple line if yearly fixed costs are about Rp250M, and about 1,000 t/yr with premium machines at about Rp500M.

Competitors and substitutes

Alternative	Offer and price	Who it serves; how it performs	Source
Local toll mills	Milling for a fee or rice share, keeping husk and bran. About Rp175/kg (Cianjur, 2013); Rp375–728/kg (West Sumatra)	Households, farmers, collectors. Near and cheap; no promised grade found; one case had idle capacity	[6], ^[7]
Mobile small mills	Milling at the farmer’s door; price not read	Farm households. Similar weight, far more broken grains in one test	[8]
Large integrated mills, including Wilmar Padi Indonesia	Buy paddy, sell branded rice; premium about Rp15,185/kg at the mill gate	Modern retail and premium buyers. Reliable volume, though many premium brands failed 2025 tests; no toll offer found (a search miss)	[2], ^[3], ^[10], ^[16], ^[17]
Rented or owned medium mills	Rent about Rp77M/yr (Pati, 2023); line with dryer about Rp400M, a smaller one about Rp175M (2021 statements)	Volume owners. Cheapest at volume; simple lines do not assure premium	[5], ^[21]
Bulog partner network and premium re-milling	Drying, milling and re-milling of Bulog’s stock; fee not found after targeted searches	Bulog only. Tens of thousands of partners; certificate from 2027; priority moved to community mills	[11], ^[13], ^[14], ^[20]
Wilmar Mill Engagement Program	Technology and technical support; price unknown	About 92 mills in Banten and East Java; no results published	[19]
Selling the paddy unmilled	Bulog’s standard Rp6,500/kg of harvested paddy, any quality; market above Rp7,000–8,000 in October 2026	Farmers and collectors. Quick cash; gives up the processing margin	[4], ^[15], ^[20]
Grants and village cooperatives	Free or subsidised lines and proposed shared dryers	Selected groups. Policy proposal more than delivered service	[2], ^[7]

Evidence ledger

Observed: the price gap; the standard’s thresholds; toll fees; Pati’s costs and income; few, household-sized toll customers in one case; Bulog’s premium releases. Inferred: toll mills’ weak incentive on grade; large mills not offering toll work; unbranded lots earning less than the official gap. Hypothesis: the opening itself, and the idea that owners of about 100–1,000 t/yr are numerous and would pay. Contradictory evidence: Bulog’s Demak remark that simple machines can yield good rice from good paddy ^[22]; the association head’s 62.28% against a 65% minimum for small mills, a gap of about 2.7 points that would rival the grade gain if real, on a different basis from the ministry figures ^[18]; and Bulog’s toll arrangement averaging 50.8% recovery ^[15], which shows how far results can vary. A competing explanation of the gap: it may partly pay for brand, packaging and marketing, not grain quality alone.

Guaranteed-grade contract milling: details

Partners: mill owners (rent), an accredited grain lab or surveyor (per-sample fee), and regional buyers (lower risk of mis-graded rice after 2025’s enforcement). None has been approached and no commitment exists. Founding needs: Rp10–30B of capital across 10–20 sites (assumption). Advantage: repeatable, not defensible. Levers: quality first, then access and price. Decisive test: the split-lot trial above, comparing the same paddy through the owner’s usual toll mill and measuring kilos of whole rice, broken share, moisture, grade, buyer’s price and all-in cost per tonne. Best to investigate first and also the largest potential among the strategies reviewed, because its uncertainty is cheap to resolve and it addresses the largest documented money.

Routes considered

Harvest-peak drying hub. A fixed husk-fuelled dryer and cleaner near a harvest cluster, charging about Rp100–150/kg (assumption) against sun-drying labour of Rp150/kg in West Sumatra ^[7]. Dryer shortage is an observed bottleneck ^[2], but Bulog’s drying partners, 162 in Lampung alone ^[20], and mills’ own dryers take the peak. About Rp300–450M a season on 3,000 t (illustrative) is too little for a dedicated company, so it works better as a first service at a contract-milling site. Decisive assumption: owners pay a cash fee above the dryer’s cost in the peak. Test: pre-sell one harvest to a cooperative and two traders; weakened if under 200 t is committed at Rp100/kg or more.

Pay-from-gain mill upgrade. A provider installs machines at an owner’s mill for a per-tonne fee and a share of measured gain. Surveyed Pati mills already pay government-backed loan instalments of about Rp60–79M a year ^[5], so owners could borrow and copy it once the gain is visible; at 2 points on 1,750 t a half share is about Rp190M, a thin margin. Decisive assumption: an owner with bank access prefers sharing the gain over borrowing. Test: offer the contract to five medium mill owners after a measured trial; weakened if none signs for at least three years.

Rejected or folded in: mobile dryers and towable lines (added hauling with no shown advantage over a nearby fixed unit); off-season toll aggregation (months of holding cost, with no source showing better recovery); ambient-air silo drying (no source shows it copes with very wet paddy in a rainy harvest); side-product pooling (no source shows energy buyers paying enough); verification-only software (no machine to control the result, though its lot records are kept in the featured business).

Open questions

How much paddy do non-mill owners control in Java? What do Java toll mills charge today? What does a premium-capable retrofit cost on an old line? Can a lab turn round a lot certificate at harvest, and at what price? Would a distributor pay an unbranded seller for a tested lot? Could a corporate operator earn Bulog’s 2027 certificate, and what toll fee does Bulog pay? We searched for that fee, a Java toll tariff and comparable service companies and did not find them, which is not evidence that they do not exist.

Sources

1. ANTARA: Indef paparkan alasan harga beras masih tinggi meski stok melimpah (5 Nov 2026) ↩

Full text. Government stock, medium price, ceilings, repacking. One researcher’s account at a public discussion.

2. ICASEPS Agro-Socioeconomic Newsletter: Optimizing the Governance of Rice Milling Systems (April 2026) ↩

Pages 1–3 read. Recovery by mill size, absorption shares, Java share, margins, missing dryers and cleaners, policy proposals. The newsletter summarises research; its underlying data were not read.

3. Investortrust: Harga beras premium naik 10,52% setahun (Oct 2026) ↩

BPS September 2026 mill-gate prices. National averages.

4. Katadata: BPS catat harga beras eceran masih naik (Nov 2026) ↩

October price changes, Bulog’s 300,000 t order and 71–72 thousand t distributed, the head’s remark on paddy prices.

5. Yunita et al.: Analisis Pendapatan Usaha Penggilingan Padi di Kabupaten Pati (Jurnal Agribisnis Indonesia, Dec 2024) ↩

Full paper read. 40 purposively sampled merchant mills, 2023 survey. Not representative; figures quoted as reported.

6. Putri et al.: Kinerja usaha penggilingan padi, tiga usaha di Cianjur (Jurnal Agribisnis Indonesia, Dec 2013) ↩

Tables 1–2 and activity sections read. Three cases; the authors say they cannot be generalised.

7. Jorie et al.: Analisis dampak revitalisasi penggilingan padi skala kecil, Sumatera Barat (Jurnal Pembangunan Nagari, June 2026) ↩

Yield and income tables read. Used for fees and drying labour only; recoveries are farmer-reported.

8. Ulfa, Hariyadi and Muhandri: Rendemen giling dan mutu beras pada unit penggiling padi kecil keliling di Banyuwangi (Jurnal Mutu Pangan, 2014) ↩

Abstract only. About 12 kg batches at 12 mobile units, compared with large mills.